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Rostankovski is the owner of residential rental property located on Spruce

Street, in Hammond, Indiana. On October 24, 2017, Hammond filed a

Complaint against Rostankovski in the Hammond City Court (City Court),

alleging a violation of Hammond’s zoning ordinance. Rostankovski filed a

motion to dismiss Hammond’s Complaint, to which Hammond responded. On

April 20, 2018, after conducting a hearing, the City Court issued an Order,

concluding that Hammond’s Complaint was barred by laches and consequently

dismissed the Complaint.

[5] On April 30, 2018, Hammond filed a motion for trial de novo with the Lake

County Superior Court (Superior Court), which was denied on May 7, 2018. In

its order, the Superior Court found:

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Motion for Trial De Novo is denied. Trial De Novo Rule 2A1 states, “a defendant who has statutory right to appeal . . .” It does not contemplate appeal by anyone other than the defendant.

However, if [Hammond] is of the opinion it has a right to pursue appeal pursuant to [Ind. Code §] 33-35-5-10, [Hammond] shall file an appeal in conformity with the requirements of the statute within 30 days.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 48). In accordance with the Superior Court’s

order, on May 30, 2018, Hammond filed its petition for appellate review of the

judgment issued by the City Court pursuant to I.C. § 33-35-5-10 with the

Superior Court. The following day, on May 31, 2018, the Superior Court

dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In its Order, the

Superior Court concluded, in pertinent part:

Now [Hammond] urges that pursuant to [I.C. § 33-35-5-10]1 it may appeal, pursuant to the statute regarding the appeal of a civil case from Hammond City Court. However, once again, the court must rule it has no subject matter jurisdiction.

Although the statute in question does allow for any party to appeal a civil case in the manner prescribed, and ordinance cases are considered civil in nature, the problem here is one of conflict of laws. While the statute allows for civil appeals by any party, the De Novo Rules do not allow for the appeals of [o]rdinance [v]iolations by [Hammond]. In such a situation of conflict, the



1 In its Order, the Superior Court referred to I.C. § 35-33-5-10. However, we assume the Superior Court transposed the Title and Article numbers as I.C § 35-33 deals with the preliminary proceedings in criminal law.

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more specific law will control. See Economy Oil Corporation v. Indiana Department of Revenue, 321 N.E.2d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974). As the De Novo Rules address ordinances specifically, and the statute addresses civil cases generally, the De Novo Rules, which are propagated by our Supreme Court, which also entitled them to preference in event of conflict of law, must control.

(Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 4). On June 29, 2018, Hammond filed a motion to

correct error which the Superior Court denied without a hearing on July 11,

2018.

[6] Hammond now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

[7] Hammond contends that the Superior Court erred when it dismissed its appeal

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Implicitly no longer pursuing an appeal

de novo, Hammond maintains that, as an issue of first impression, Ind. Code

section 33-35-5-10 remains a valid procedural avenue to appeal an adverse civil

judgment.

[8] The standard of review applicable to a court’s grant or denial of a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(1) is a function of what occurred in the

trial court. Outboard Boating Club of Evansville, Inc. v. Ind. State Dept. of Health,

952 N.E.2d 340, 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. Where, as here, the

relevant facts before the trial court are not in dispute, then the question of

subject matter jurisdiction is purely one of law and no deference is afforded to

the trial court’s conclusion. Id.

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[9] Pursuant to Ind. Code section 33-35-2-3, a city court has “jurisdiction of all

violations of the ordinances of the city.” An appeal from a city or town court

acting in accordance with its jurisdictional power enumerated in I.C. § 33-35-2

3 is statutorily governed by I.C. § 33-35-5-9(a), which stipulates that “an appeal

from a judgment of a city court may be taken to the circuit, superior, or probate

court of the county and tried de novo.” Our supreme court has promulgated the

Indiana Trial De Novo rules which specifically govern the procedural

requirements after a party has elected a Trial De Novo appeal as permitted by

statute. Indiana Trial De Novo Rule 2(A) addresses the de novo procedure

following a judgment of ordinance violation in City Court as follows:

(1) A defendant who has a statutory right to an appeal after a trial for an infraction or ordinance violation in a city or town court may request and shall receive the trial de novo as provided in this rule.

(2) A city or town court defendant who admitted committing an infraction or ordinance violation and therefore had no trial in city or town court may request as provided in this rule that the circuit or superior court either:

(a) Permit the defendant to withdraw the admission and have a trial de novo; or

(b) Provide a trial de novo on the sanctions.

[10] Accordingly, although at first glance I.C. § 33-35-5-9 permits Hammond to

appeal the adverse judgment to the Superior Court and try the Complaint de

novo, Indiana’s procedural De Novo rules explicitly advance this right only to ‘a

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defendant.’ As Hammond was not the defendant, but rather the plaintiff,

before the City Court, it cannot avail itself of the permissive right of an appeal

de novo before the Superior Court pursuant to I.C. § 33-35-5-9.

[11] Focusing on I.C. § 33-35-5-10, Hammond posits that the statute grants it a

“non-de novo” appellate review of a civil action originating in the City Court.

(Appellant’s Br. p. 11). Indiana Code section 33-35-5-10 provides, in pertinent

part:

(a) A party in a civil action who desires to take an appeal from the city court of the three (3) cities having the largest populations in a county having a population of more than four hundred thousand (400,000) but less than seven hundred thousand (700,000) shall file a bond, to the approval of the city court, within thirty (30) days after the date of rendition of final judgment, and the motion to correct errors within ten (10) days after the rendition of final judgment. The transcript and motion shall be filed in the court to which the appeal is taken within thirty (30) days after the motion has been signed by the court.

(b) All errors saved shall be reviewed as far as justice warrants, and for that purpose, a complete transcript of all the evidence is not required. An error occurring during the trial, not excepted to at the time, may be made available upon appeal by setting it forth in a motion for a new trial. . . .

Hammond complied with the procedural standing requirements to proceed

under the statute. It provided population statistics, tendered a bond approved

by the City Court, and timely filed the transcript and motion with the Superior

Court.

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[12] Quoting Economy Oil Corporation for its proposition that the specific law of the

Indiana De Novo Rules controlled over the more general statute, the Superior

Court dismissed Hammond’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We

disagree. While I.C. § 33-35-5-9, in combination with Indiana Trial De Novo

Rule 2, limits an appeal from a judgment of a City Court to a De Novo trial for

defendants only, no such limitations are incorporated in I.C. § 33-35-5-10.

Rather, after satisfying the procedural standing requirements, “a party in a civil

action” can have its “errors reviewed” by “the court to which the appeal is

taken.” I.C. § 33-35-5-10. As a violation of a zoning ordinance is undeniably

civil in nature, and Hammond satisfied the procedural prerequisites of

population, bond, and transcript, Hammond is statutorily allowed to proceed

with its appeal before the Superior Court.

[13] Even though both statutes at issue—I.C. § 33-35-5-9 and I.C. § 33-35-5-10—

relate to the same general subject matter, and thus are in pari materi, the statutes

can be construed together to produce an harmonious system. See Econ. Oil

Corp., 321 N.E.2d at 218. Specifically, both statutes govern the appeals of city

courts; however, where I.C. § 33-35-5-9 focuses on De Novo appeals and is

further limited by the Indiana De Novo Trial Rules promulgated by our supreme

court, I.C. § 33-35-5-10, on the other hand, focuses on regular—non-De Novo—

civil appeals from qualifying city courts. Thus, although the same general

subject matter is covered by both statutes, their individual focus and

requirements are different and therefore do not encroach but rather can be

harmonized. See Econ Oil Corp., 321 N.E.2d at 218 (When two statutes on the

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same subject must be construed together, the court should attempt to give effect

to both). Deciding otherwise, and precluding Hammond to avail itself of an

appellate avenue under I.C. § 33-35-5-10—as urged by Rostankovski—would

leave Hammond without any remedy for relief from a presumedly erroneous

negative judgment. Accordingly, we reverse the Superior Court’s Order and

remand for further proceedings.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Superior Court erred by

dismissing Hammond’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.



Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.